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Update module github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2 to v2.4.1 [SECURITY] - autoclosed - #373

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2 v2.3.0 → v2.4.1 age confidence

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the warning logs for more information.


go-tuf affected by client DoS via malformed server response

CVE-2026-23991 / GHSA-846p-jg2w-w324

More information

Details

Security Disclosure: Client DoS via malformed server response
Summary

If the TUF repository (or any of its mirrors) returns invalid TUF metadata JSON (valid JSON but not well formed TUF metadata), the client will panic during parsing, causing a DoS. The panic happens before any signature is validated. This means that a compromised repository/mirror/cache can DoS clients without having access to any signing key.

Impact

Client crashes upon receiving and parsing malformed TUF metadata. This can cause long running services to enter an restart/crash loop.

Workarounds

None currently.

Affected code

The metadata.checkType function did not properly type assert the (untrusted) input causing it to panic on malformed data.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


go-tuf improperly validates the configured threshold for delegations

CVE-2026-23992 / GHSA-fphv-w9fq-2525

More information

Details

Security Disclosure: Improper validation of configured threshold for delegations
Summary

A compromised or misconfigured TUF repository can have the configured value of signature thresholds set to 0, which effectively disables signature verification.

Impact

Unathorized modification to TUF metadata files is possible at rest, or during transit as no integrity checks are made.

Patches

Upgrade to v2.3.1

Workarounds

Always make sure that the TUF metadata roles are configured with a threshold of at least 1.

Affected code:

The metadata.VerifyDelegate did not verify the configured threshold prior to comparison. This means that a misconfigured TUF repository could disable the signature verification by setting the threshold to 0, or a negative value (and so always make the signature threshold computation to pass).

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names

CVE-2026-24686 / GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4

More information

Details

Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client
Summary

go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (repoName) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a repoName containing traversal (e.g., ../escaped-repo) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended LocalMetadataDir cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions.

Affected Component
Field Value
File metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go
Function (*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error
Callsite metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName) (around line 129 at the pinned commit)
Impact

When the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment.

Note: Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue.

Attacker Model
  • Attacker can cause the application to load a TAP 4 map file whose repositories keys are attacker-controlled (for example: fetched from a URL, supply-chain substituted, or otherwise attacker-influenced input).
  • Local caching is enabled (DisableLocalCache=false) and the configured LocalMetadataDir is writable by the running process.

Claim Ceiling: HIGH when the map file is attacker-controlled; if the map file is always local and trusted, this is closer to a configuration footgun and likely lands as MEDIUM/LOW.

Field Value
Affected Versions ≤ 2.4.0
Verified On Commit bde5f18dc95dfac365fc452ee4e278e5fd66d4b4 (tag v2.4.0)

Note: First affected version has not been bisected.

Reproduction

Attachments include poc.zip with:

  • canonical.log (contains [CALLSITE_HIT], [PROOF_MARKER])
  • control.log (contains [CALLSITE_HIT], [NC_MARKER], does not contain [PROOF_MARKER])
  • fix.patch (minimal validation sketch)

Expected: Multirepo repository names are treated as identifiers; a TAP 4 map file containing traversal or absolute paths is rejected (or safely normalized so that all writes stay under LocalMetadataDir).

Actual: A traversal repoName escapes LocalMetadataDir and go-tuf persists root.json under the escaped path during initialization.

Run Local Repro
rm -rf _poc
mkdir -p _poc
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d _poc
cd _poc/poc
make canonical
make control
Workarounds
  1. Treat TAP 4 map files as trusted configuration only (do not fetch from untrusted sources).
  2. Validate repo names before passing the map file to go-tuf (reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components like . / ..).
  3. If acceptable for the application, disable local caching to avoid writing metadata to disk (DisableLocalCache=true).
Suggested Remediation

Validate multirepo repository names as identifiers (not paths) before using them in filepath.Join. Reject:

  • Absolute paths
  • Path separators (/ and \)
  • Traversal components (. and ..)

If it is important to accept a wider set of repo names, a safer alternative is to map repo names to a stable, validated directory name (for example via encoding or hashing) and to ensure all writes stay under the cache base directory.

Triage Questions
  1. Is the TAP 4 map file expected to ever be fetched from untrusted sources in supported deployments?
  2. Should invalid repo names be treated as a hard error (reject initialization), or as a soft error (skip that repository entry)?
Attachments

Reported by: Oleh

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.7 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


go-tuf affected by client DoS via malformed server response

CVE-2026-23991 / GHSA-846p-jg2w-w324 / GO-2026-4348

More information

Details

Security Disclosure: Client DoS via malformed server response
Summary

If the TUF repository (or any of its mirrors) returns invalid TUF metadata JSON (valid JSON but not well formed TUF metadata), the client will panic during parsing, causing a DoS. The panic happens before any signature is validated. This means that a compromised repository/mirror/cache can DoS clients without having access to any signing key.

Impact

Client crashes upon receiving and parsing malformed TUF metadata. This can cause long running services to enter an restart/crash loop.

Workarounds

None currently.

Affected code

The metadata.checkType function did not properly type assert the (untrusted) input causing it to panic on malformed data.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


go-tuf improperly validates the configured threshold for delegations

CVE-2026-23992 / GHSA-fphv-w9fq-2525 / GO-2026-4349

More information

Details

Security Disclosure: Improper validation of configured threshold for delegations
Summary

A compromised or misconfigured TUF repository can have the configured value of signature thresholds set to 0, which effectively disables signature verification.

Impact

Unathorized modification to TUF metadata files is possible at rest, or during transit as no integrity checks are made.

Patches

Upgrade to v2.3.1

Workarounds

Always make sure that the TUF metadata roles are configured with a threshold of at least 1.

Affected code:

The metadata.VerifyDelegate did not verify the configured threshold prior to comparison. This means that a misconfigured TUF repository could disable the signature verification by setting the threshold to 0, or a negative value (and so always make the signature threshold computation to pass).

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Client DoS via malformed server response in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

CVE-2026-23991 / GHSA-846p-jg2w-w324 / GO-2026-4348

More information

Details

Client DoS via malformed server response in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Improper validattion of configured threshold for delegations in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

CVE-2026-23992 / GHSA-fphv-w9fq-2525 / GO-2026-4349

More information

Details

Improper validattion of configured threshold for delegations in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names

CVE-2026-24686 / GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4 / GO-2026-4377

More information

Details

Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client
Summary

go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (repoName) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a repoName containing traversal (e.g., ../escaped-repo) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended LocalMetadataDir cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions.

Affected Component
Field Value
File metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go
Function (*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error
Callsite metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName) (around line 129 at the pinned commit)
Impact

When the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment.

Note: Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue.

Attacker Model
  • Attacker can cause the application to load a TAP 4 map file whose repositories keys are attacker-controlled (for example: fetched from a URL, supply-chain substituted, or otherwise attacker-influenced input).
  • Local caching is enabled (DisableLocalCache=false) and the configured LocalMetadataDir is writable by the running process.

Claim Ceiling: HIGH when the map file is attacker-controlled; if the map file is always local and trusted, this is closer to a configuration footgun and likely lands as MEDIUM/LOW.

Field Value
Affected Versions ≤ 2.4.0
Verified On Commit bde5f18dc95dfac365fc452ee4e278e5fd66d4b4 (tag v2.4.0)

Note: First affected version has not been bisected.

Reproduction

Attachments include poc.zip with:

  • canonical.log (contains [CALLSITE_HIT], [PROOF_MARKER])
  • control.log (contains [CALLSITE_HIT], [NC_MARKER], does not contain [PROOF_MARKER])
  • fix.patch (minimal validation sketch)

Expected: Multirepo repository names are treated as identifiers; a TAP 4 map file containing traversal or absolute paths is rejected (or safely normalized so that all writes stay under LocalMetadataDir).

Actual: A traversal repoName escapes LocalMetadataDir and go-tuf persists root.json under the escaped path during initialization.

Run Local Repro
rm -rf _poc
mkdir -p _poc
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d _poc
cd _poc/poc
make canonical
make control
Workarounds
  1. Treat TAP 4 map files as trusted configuration only (do not fetch from untrusted sources).
  2. Validate repo names before passing the map file to go-tuf (reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components like . / ..).
  3. If acceptable for the application, disable local caching to avoid writing metadata to disk (DisableLocalCache=true).
Suggested Remediation

Validate multirepo repository names as identifiers (not paths) before using them in filepath.Join. Reject:

  • Absolute paths
  • Path separators (/ and \)
  • Traversal components (. and ..)

If it is important to accept a wider set of repo names, a safer alternative is to map repo names to a stable, validated directory name (for example via encoding or hashing) and to ensure all writes stay under the cache base directory.

Triage Questions
  1. Is the TAP 4 map file expected to ever be fetched from untrusted sources in supported deployments?
  2. Should invalid repo names be treated as a hard error (reject initialization), or as a soft error (skip that repository entry)?
Attachments

Reported by: Oleh

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.7 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Path traversal in TAP 4 multirepo client allows arbitrary file write via repo names in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

CVE-2026-24686 / GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4 / GO-2026-4377

More information

Details

Path traversal in TAP 4 multirepo client allows arbitrary file write via repo names in github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf

Severity

Unknown

References

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

theupdateframework/go-tuf (github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2)

v2.4.1

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: theupdateframework/go-tuf@v2.4.0...v2.4.1

v2.4.0

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: theupdateframework/go-tuf@v2.3.1...v2.4.0

v2.3.1

Compare Source

What's Changed

Full Changelog: theupdateframework/go-tuf@v2.3.0...v2.3.1


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🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


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This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate CLI.

@renovate-update-app
renovate-update-app Bot enabled auto-merge (squash) October 26, 2026 01:40

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Auto-approving verified Renovate commits with native automerge enabled.

@renovate-update-app renovate-update-app Bot changed the title Update module github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2 to v2.4.1 [SECURITY] Update module github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2 to v2.4.1 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Oct 26, 2026
auto-merge was automatically disabled October 26, 2026 08:36

Pull request was closed

@renovate-update-app
renovate-update-app Bot deleted the renovate/go-github.com-theupdateframework-go-tuf-v2-vulnerability branch October 26, 2026 08:36
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